With faults restricting RFA Argus to port, the armed forces have no amphibious vessels available for operations; but ministers refuse to accept reality
The MOD has a strange schizophrenic personality in that externally, everything is cheerful to the point of denial of reality, while internally, people are often exceptionally pessimistic and risk-adverse to the point of impotence (one of the reasons I left).
Another concern the Royal Marines will have is that amphibious warfare (or littoral strike, as they are calling it these days) frankly just isn't high enough a priority on the long list of problems screaming to be solved. This hasn't been helped by the Royals themselves deciding in 2019 that they were 'Special Operations Forces' and going down that route in yet another round of the eternal Para/Commando fight for relevance.
I agree. I think there’s possibly a deeper conversation to be had about what we need in terms of “littoral strike” capability - I can’t think of a substantial amphibious operation since al-Faw in 2003, and before that… - but there may be other forms of warfare we could, should or would like to be able to undertake. But then I think of the internecine violence the USMC’s Force Design has caused…
Indeed. I've heard convincing arguments that we should, as an example, bring back the Royal Marine Artillery armed with anti ship missiles as a way of making them more immediately relevant for a conventional fight in the High North. Ofc, that might not be ally enough for the bootnecks...
Great overview.
The MOD has a strange schizophrenic personality in that externally, everything is cheerful to the point of denial of reality, while internally, people are often exceptionally pessimistic and risk-adverse to the point of impotence (one of the reasons I left).
Another concern the Royal Marines will have is that amphibious warfare (or littoral strike, as they are calling it these days) frankly just isn't high enough a priority on the long list of problems screaming to be solved. This hasn't been helped by the Royals themselves deciding in 2019 that they were 'Special Operations Forces' and going down that route in yet another round of the eternal Para/Commando fight for relevance.
I agree. I think there’s possibly a deeper conversation to be had about what we need in terms of “littoral strike” capability - I can’t think of a substantial amphibious operation since al-Faw in 2003, and before that… - but there may be other forms of warfare we could, should or would like to be able to undertake. But then I think of the internecine violence the USMC’s Force Design has caused…
Indeed. I've heard convincing arguments that we should, as an example, bring back the Royal Marine Artillery armed with anti ship missiles as a way of making them more immediately relevant for a conventional fight in the High North. Ofc, that might not be ally enough for the bootnecks...