Reflections on politics of the week
Berlin lifts the debt brake, the outgoing foreign minister is sizing up a new role, and a Royal Navy submarine returns to port after six months underwater
Perhaps Lenten vows have kicked in and everyone is suddenly focused, or it’s the impending arrival of spring, but a lot seems to be happening at the moment. Even setting aside ongoing events in the war in Ukraine, Israel’s resumption of its offensive in Gaza, the government’s publication of proposals to reform the welfare system and Kemi Badenoch’s announcement of the Conservative Party’s Policy Renewal Programme, there are a few items to note lest they fall unremarked between the cracks of the headlines.
Germany releases the debt brake
A fortnight ago, I explained that the likely next Federal Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was seeking to use the last days of the outgoing Bundestag’s mandate to make constitutional changes to lift the country’s so-called “debt brake”. This device limited Germany’s structural debt to 0.35 per cent of gross domestic product, a fiscal straitjacket which was a legacy of the Merkel years, and Merz sought to exempt defence spending and assistance to Ukraine from its provisions. This would pave the way for substantial investment in the Bundeswehr, as well as a €500 billion infrastructure and climate fund demanded by the Greens. Because it involved amending the Basic Law, Germany’s post-war constitution, it required the approval of a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag.
The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), had come round to the idea of amending the debt brake, and had the support of their likely coalition partners in a new government, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The infrastructure and climate fund was the price for the support of the Greens, but it was bitterly opposed by the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the far-left Die Linke. When the new Bundestag assembles later this month, the AfD and Die Linke will be able to muster a blocking minority of 211, but they cannot in the composition of the outgoing legislature. Merz needed 491 votes from the larger and soon defunct body of 735 lawmakers: 720 cast their votes, and 513 supported Merz’s proposals. The measures will be considered on Friday by the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament representing the 16 federal Länder, which is expected to back them.
(A passing point of constitutional interest: there is an argument that the Bundesrat is not the upper house of the German legislature and that the Bundestag is a unicameral body. While the Federal Constitutional Court uses the phrase “upper house” in English translations of its rulings, it has also described the Bundesrat as a “second chamber existing beside the parliament”. Bills are not automatically considered by the Bundesrat in the way that they are by, for example, the House of Lords, let alone in a broadly similar process. “Consent bills” or Zustimmungsgesetze, which would amend the Basic Law, directly affect the Länder or be enforced at a state level, must be approved in the Bundesrat by a simple majority, but “objection bills” or Einspruchsgestze, which do not meet those criteria, become law unless the Bundesrat actively registers an objection. Additionally, the Bundesrat cannot amend bills and can only decide on a bill in the form in which the Bundestag has agreed it, even if the bill originated in the Bundesrat. The members of the Bundesrat are nominated by the governments of the Länder, and each delegation must vote as a single bloc by unanimity; if there is disagreement within the delegation, it will abstain. The Bundestag describes itself as “the most important organ of the legislative branch”, regarding the Bundesrat, along with the Landtage, as separate institutions. But I digress.)
Friedrich Merz and his potential colleagues and coalition partners will be relieved to enact these changes. But the political cost is not yet known. While the SPD has favoured amending the debt brake for some time—Lars Klingbeil, the party’s leader in the Bundestag, called it “the result of a debate that has been going on for years”—Merz himself had previously been sceptical about the move. The CDU entered the campaign for February’s Bundestag election committed to the debt brake on the grounds that “today’s debts are tomorrow’s tax increases”, and in a television debate against Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the SPD, Merz moved only a small distance.
I have always said that you can discuss this, but definitely not at first. First, comes the savings potential, growth and also the budget reallocations that are urgently needed.
That position has now been abandoned. There is nothing incoherent in Merz’s change of stance. He told the Bundestag on Tuesday:
Such debt can only be justified under very specific circumstances. The circumstances are determined above all by Putin’s war of aggression against Europe.
Nevertheless, he has given his opponents on both left and right an obvious opening. Tino Chrupalla, co-leader of the AfD, mocked the would-be Chancellor.
What do you actually stand for, Mr Merz? You have by now had the mRNA of the SPD implanted in you.
It is easy to see reflections of the populist right’s attack across the world on political establishments and “uniparties”, with an additional hint of the controversies of the Covid-19 pandemic and associated conspiracy theories about vaccines in the reference to mRNA. He went on to accuse Merz of having lost his political credibility.
The most valuable asset politicians have is credibility. With these embarrassing actions, dear Mr Merz, you’ve already completely lost yours. The voters feel betrayed by you—and rightly so.
Meanwhile, with barely concealed glee, his co-leader, Alice Weidel, described the release of the debt brake as “the death blow for the Euro”.
At the beginning of the year, I explored Friedrich Merz’s likely options for creating a coalition after the Bundestag elections. As expected, the AfD, which won 152 seats out of 630 and 20 per cent of the vote, remains behind the Brandmauer, the “firewall”, which the mainstream parties have constructed and which means they will not co-operate in any formal way with the AfD; it will, therefore, be the main opposition party. Die Linke sprung a late surprise by winning 64 seats and 8.8 per cent of the vote, and, in a triumphant demonstration of the horseshoe effect of politics, find themselves in agreement on a number of issues with the AfD.
The CDU/CSU Union and the SPD are likely to agree a coalition deal and its 328 seats would give Merz a slender but working majority in the Bundestag. Outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz (who, interestingly enough, has never been the SPD’s formal national leader despite more than three years as head of the government) will quit the political stage; his party’s most popular figure is the current Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, who was for some time touted as a possible Chancellor candidate or Kanzlerkandidat in place of Scholz but ruled himself out. Pistorius has offered to play a “leadership role” on behalf of the SPD and it has been suggested he could become Vice-Chancellor to Merz and continue as Minister of Defence; he has been widely praised in his current role and is the first incumbent for at least a decade not to be a flop or an active disaster.
Nevertheless, the next government faces an enormous challenge. Not only must it expand, rebuild and re-equip the Bundeswehr and help forge a new defence posture for Europe, it needs to help an ailing economy, take action on immigration, assimilation and crime which reassures a restive, angry and distrustful electorate, repair ageing infrastructure and address fundamental questions about energy security and the future of nuclear power. If Friedrich Merz can achieve half of that, he will be one of the greatest Chancellors in the Federal Republic’s history. But many doubt he can do so.
Bigger and better things
One of the few figures to emerge from recent years in German politics with some credit in several quarters has been the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Annalena Baerbock of the Greens. The party’s Kanzlerkandidat in 2021, she was co-leader with Robert Habeck, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Economics and Climate Action, from 2018 to 2022, and has been lauded for a centrist but tough-minded foreign policy. Skilfully for a Green politician, she has sketched out a “post-pacifist” approach to international affairs, taking a hard line against Russian aggression and Chinese expansionism while advocating a stronger common EU foreign and security policy. Perhaps most importantly, given some of her colleagues, Baerbock has given the impression of careful, unruffled and thoughtful, if sometimes sharply worded, competence. While none of Scholz’s cabinet is held in high esteem overall, polls last year showed she was better regarded than any minister except Boris Pistorius (see above).
The Greens, reduced to 85 seats in the new Bundestag and receiving only 11.6 per cent of the vote, will leave government when a new coalition is appointed. However, Politico reports that Baerbock, after nearly three and a half years at the Foreign Office, could be nominated to be President of the United Nations General Assembly for a one-year term from June. The role rotates between the UN’s five geographic groups and the next candidate is due to be chosen from the Group of Western European and Other States.
The President chairs meetings of the General Assembly, assisted by no fewer than 21 vice-presidents from the General Committee, and his or her role is relatively limited, representing member states as a whole and giving an address at the opening of the General Assembly’s session in September. However, German politicians are relatively rare in senior positions in international and multilateral organisations: Walter Hallstein was the first President of the European Commission (1958-67) and Ursula von der Leyen has been in office since 2019; Manfred Wörner was Secretary General of NATO from 1988 to 1994 (dying in office); Rüdiger von Wechmar (1980-81) and Peter Florin (of the German Democratic Republic) (1987-88) were presidents of the UN General Assembly; Horst Köhler was Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund from 2000 to 2004; and Georg Kahn-Ackermann was Secretary General of the Council of Europe 1974-79. That is a modest return for a country of Germany’s size and influence.
Moreover, Baerbock is only 44 years old. In a world in which the President of the United States is 78, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Prime Minister of Israel are 75, the Prime Minister of France is 73, the probable next Chancellor of Germany is 69, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands is 68, the President of the European Commission is 66, the British and Australian Prime Ministers are 62 and the new Prime Minister of Canada is 60, she may feel that she has plenty of time to develop her career. Even a relatively ceremonial role at what I have no hesitation in describing as a failing and ineffective organisation may be a useful continuation of her public career. We shall see.
Under the sea
On Monday, one of the Royal Navy’s Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines returned to its home base as HMNB Clyde at Faslane after being at sea for 204 days. It is the longest patrol ever carried out by a Royal Navy submarine carrying nuclear missiles, beating the previous record of 195 days, set in 2023, but the last eight operational deployments by Vanguard-class boats carrying the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent have all exceeded five months.
We need to keep in mind exactly what this entails. The Royal Navy has undertaken Operation Relentless, which provides continuous at sea deterrence (CASD), since 1969, meaning that at every second of every minute of every hour of every day for more than 55 years, a nuclear submarine armed with ballistic missiles (first Polaris, then Trident) has been on patrol somewhere in the world, capable of launching a nuclear strike. To remain undetected and thereby maintain the deterrent capability irrespective of what happens in or to the United Kingdom, the submarine must remain under the surface, and most of the crew will complete an operational patrol without ever knowing where they were.
To remain underwater for months at a time is a feat of extraordinary endurance. Sailors work a pattern of six hours on and six hours off. The boats will be served by the Royal Navy’s best chefs who will have access to high-quality ingredients, because it is well established that good food is a mainstay of morale, but fresh ingredients will not last much longer than a fortnight, and, ultimately, storage space is limited. Sleeping accommodation is cramped and up to nine submariners can share a single bedroom. Crew can receive two 60-word messages, known as “familygrams”, from relatives and loved ones each week, but they cannot reply.
There are four Vanguard-class missile boats: HMS Vanguard, HMS Victorious, HMS Vigilant and HMS Vengeance. It is generally agreed that CASD can only be maintained with a minimum of four submarines: one is on patrol, one will be undergoing maintenance and the other two will be in port and undertaking training exercises. Patrols in previous years were rarely longer than three months, which was considered a substantial test of endurance, and the submarines were designed to accommodate enough supplies for three to four months. More recently, two factors have combined to put the infrastructure of the deterrent—the submarines, but also and more importantly the men and (since 2014) women of the Submarine Service—under extraordinary pressure.
The first is the age of the Vanguard-class boats. They were commissioned in 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1999 and originally had an expected service life of 25 years. It does not take an arithmetical genius to deduce that even the youngest boat, HMS Vengeance, should have retired by now. In 2006, the government published a White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, which committed to replacing the submarines, but the decision was only in principle, and there were discussions about cutting the number of boats from four to three (which is really not practical) which lasted for nearly five years. Finally in 2011 then Defence Secretary Liam Fox confirmed there would be four new vessels. However, the House of Commons did not vote to confirm this until July 2016, by which time HMS Vanguard was only two years from its theoretical out-of-service date.
To accommodate this slow decision-making, Babcock International has been contracted to carry out a life extension programme on the Vanguard-class submarines. HMS Vanguard began “Long Overhaul Period and Refuel” (LOP(R)) at HMNB Devonport in December 2015, a process which was expected to take three years and cost around £200 million. She was in dock for seven years and the Ministry of Defence admitted the cost was more than £75 million per year, meaning Vanguard’s refit cost more than £500 million. Initial work began on the second boat, HMS Victorious, in July 2023, with the full LOP(R) confirmed in March 2024 at a cost of around £560 million.
Meanwhile, the Vanguard-class submarines will be replaced by four Dreadnought-class boats, HMS Dreadnought, HMS Valiant, HMS Warspite and HMS King George VI. Construction began in 2016 by BAE Systems Submarines at Barrow-in-Furness, and steel has now been cut on three of the four boats. But HMS Dreadnought will not enter service until the early 2030s, leaving the oldest of the Vanguard class at least another five or six years of active duty. It will put her 15 years or so beyond her original out-of-service date.
The second factor does not just affect the Vanguard-class boats. As I wrote last August, there have been acute shortages in availability of the Royal Navy’s five Astute-class attack submarines too. When I composed that piece, none of the boats was at sea: HMS Astute had carried out some patrols in 2023, HMS Ambush was believed to be undergoing prolonged maintenance at HMNB Clyde, HMS Artful had been alongside at the same location for 15 months, HMS Audacious was awaiting repair and maintenance and HMS Anson, only recently commissioned, had yet to put to sea on an operational deployment. Two more vessels, HMS Agamemnon and HMS Achilles, are due to be commissioned this year and next. Meanwhile, the last of the Trafalgar class hunter-killers, HMS Triumph, retired at the end of 2024.
This is partly an infrastructure problem. The submarine fleet is now based solely at HMNB Clyde, but major refitting and repairs take place at HMNB Devonport. The engineering and maintenance facilities at Devonport are undergoing major redevelopment, which will eventually provide four nuclear-certified dry docks. In the meantime, there is a backlog: in July 2023, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, admitted that there was no dock available at Devonport, and the ship lift at HMNB Clyde, used to raise the submarines out of the water, was out of service for more than a year, though it seems now to be back in service. Number 9 dry dock at Devonport re-opened after a £200 million refurbishment last September, and it is hoped that the upgrades will allow HMS Victorious to be refitted more quickly than HMS Vanguard.
All of these factors have come together: the age of the Vanguard-class boats and consequently reliability and maintenance issues, the fact that HMS Vanguard took seven years rather than three to undergo LOP(R), the delay in approving and building, let alone commissioning into service the Dreadnought-class submarines and the shortage of facilities due to planned construction and improvement as well as accidental failures. We now seem to be regarding deterrent patrols of more than six months’ duration as the norm, with no obvious relief of a significant nature until HMS Dreadnought is commissioned in “the early 2030s”.
The pressure inevitably falls on the men and women of the Submarine Service. In January 2024, The Times reported that the Ministry of Defence had to advertise the role of Director of Submarines in succession to Rear Admiral Simon Asquith on LinkedIn because there were no serving officers in the Royal Navy who were both qualified and willing to do the job. (Rear Admiral Andy Perks was eventually appointed in April last year.) In addition, there were six other positions vacant which ordinarily would be occupied by officers who had passed the Submarine Command Course, known informally but almost universally as The Perisher and regarded as one of the best and toughest courses of its kind in the world. Meanwhile, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key, admitted in 2023 that recruitment across the Royal Navy was proving difficult and that the service was understrength.
The Submarine Service is a microcosm of the armed forces: overstretched, suffering from ageing equipment and maintenance backlogs, plagued by recruitment problems. The chances are, thank God, that we will never need to use the nuclear deterrent in reality. But it is not something we can afford to leave to chance. There are very serious questions over the current circumstances continuing for five, six or more years. Deterrence relies on a credible threat. If we lose that, for any reason, we have a multi-billion pound white elephant.