Now Brussels wants its own bomb

The leader of the European People's Party wants to create a defence capablity separate from NATO, not reliant on the United States and he wants it to have nukes

The mathematician and satirist Tom Lehrer, who turns 96 in April, witheringly filleted and exposed the strangenesses of the 1950s and 1960s, from race (“National Brotherhood Week”) and religion (“The Vatican Rag”) to American imperialism (“Send the Marines”) and progressive education (“New Math”). One of his sharpest sallies, however, was against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in “Who’s Next?”, and it skewered the underlying absurdity of the arms race, as he sang

South Africa wants two, that’s right:
One for the black and one for the white!

Even more on point, in those days before the Begin/Sadat Camp David Accords, was his fancy of nuclear weapons blossoming throughout the Middle East.

Egypts gonna get one, too,
Just to use on you know who.
So Israel's getting tense,
Wants one in self defense.
”The Lord’s our shepherd,” says the psalm,
But just in case, we better get a bomb!

Of course, as Tehran glowers ever more fiercely, that seems less light-hearted. For the last half-century and more, though, policy-makers have been trying to stabilise, if not de-escalate, the nuclear arms race. The worldwide Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been in force since 1970 and states have generally tried to limit the number of new nuclear powers. Now, however, in a slightly unexpected move, Manfred Weber, the Bavarian MEP who is president of the European People’s Party, seems to be suggesting that the European Union should not only develop a stronger independent defence capability but also be equipped with nuclear weapons.

Weber is hardly the first European politician to want to enhance the EU’s military foootprint and reach, and on one level he has correctly identified the challenge which a renewed Donald Trump presidency could present to Europe’s security. Trump is widely perceived to have little regard for NATO, and, spurred on by the crude transactionalism which is his motive force, has been raising questions about American support for the alliance. He feels, not without justification, that many of the European member states have long effectively relied on the United States for a number of measures including the capability to launch nuclear weapons and the equipment to intercept those launched by the other side.

It is sensible for the European members of NATO to think about what might happen if a) Trump is elected to a second term in the White House, and b) as president he makes significant changes to the level of America’s contribution to NATO, or even, in the worst possible case, withdraws from the alliance altogether. However, beyond that, I think Weber has made a number of missteps.

The first is the frank and open way he is talking about the possibility of Europe having to become more self-sufficient. When he told Politico, “We want NATO, but we also have to be strong enough to be able to defend ourselves without it or in times of Trump”, going on to add “Europe must be able to stand on its own in terms of foreign policy and be able to defend itself independently”, there must be a concern that his tone will not mollify or reassure but inflame the laughably thin-skinned Trump. We know from his first four-year stint that Donald Trump does not base his decisions on rational assessment or careful analysis of evidence but on reflex and gut instinct, and it would be unfortunate of Weber unintentionally provoked a peevish sense of offence.

More surprising still was the speed with which Weber’s mind turned to nuclear weapons. NATO describes itself as a “nuclear alliance” but there are no assets held or controlled at an alliance level; the bulk of the capability is provided by the United States, which has around 100 nuclear weapons at six bases in five countries. The devices are stored at Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Büchel Air Base in Germany, Aviano and Ghedi Air Bases in Italy, Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands and Incirlik in Turkey , but are not armed or deployed on aircraft but kept in underground bunkers. Clearly the removal of these weapons would have a transformational effect on Europe’s nuclear strength.

Only three NATO member states are also nuclear powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. However, if the US were taken out of the equation, and if the focus were to switch to a European Union context instead, therebyu also excluding the UK, you would effectively be playing the entire weight of the EU’s nuclear responsibility on France’s shoulders. France has scaled down its capability over the past 20 years, committing only to maintaining “strict sufficiency”, that is, the lowest level of arsenal required to represent a deterrent. This is also framed in France as dissuasion du faible au fort (“deterrence from the weak to the strong”), whereby France does not seek to be able to carry out overwhelming first or retaliatory strikes, but maintains the ability to inflict sufficient harm to make a nuclear exchange too costly.

France has air-launched nuclear weapons and missiles which can be fired from its four Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines but decommissioned its land-based missile silos in the 1990s. There is a stockpile of around 300 warheads, which, as President Nicolas Sarkozy noted in 2008, is half the number it possessed at the height of the Cold War. According to a 2017 review, nuclear weapons are maintained at a level which “would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence”, though the definition of France’s vital interests is not explicit. In 2020, President Emmanuel Macron admitted that “vital interests now have a European dimension”, and he sought a discussion on the “role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in [its] collective security”. This was largely aimed at Germany, and there was no positive response from Berlin. Macron emphasised in 2022 that the offer the work more closely with Germany remained open. However, he clarified in October 2022 that France’s vital interests “would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region”.

Weber’s ultimate ambition is for a truly European nuclear deterrent. He explained to Politico:

I would like to see the European dimension of nuclear defence as a long-term goal. But as long as this is not realistic, we should take up Macron’s offer and think now about how France’s nuclear armament can also be embedded in European structures.

However, this leads on to other problems. The immediate one is that expecting France, which maintains a minimum deterrent, to assume responsibility for the whole European Union is a substantial request. The second is that, if the EU were to move towards developing a more broadly based nuclear capability, including Germany and perhaps other member states, it would be the very opposite direction of travel from the intentions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At a time when the West is doing its best to constrain Iran’s obvious desire to develop nuclear weapons, this would create huge presentational and diplomatic challenges.

For me, though, the most deep-seated problem is this: under what circumstances would this capability ever be used? Growing in the later stages of the Cold War, I took the possession of nuclear weapons for granted, and disarmament, especially unilateral disarmament, was a quirk of the far Left. Since then, however, I have drifted into a position of uneasy uncertainly and scepticism. I set out this near-Damascene conversion as straightforwardly as I could in CapX in August 2021, though it still troubles me and I sometimes shy away from following my instincts and reasoning to their inevitable conclusions. A few days ago I wrote an article for The Hill in which I questioned the logic and value of the United States Air Force replacing its ground-based system of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Minuteman III. The replacement is now scheduled to cost at least $131 billion, and, returning to my earlier point, I simply cannot fathom the circumstances under which the new Sentinel missiles would ever be used.

Manfred Weber seems to be articulating an approach which could be damaging in many ways. It seems to me to risk exacerbating tensions between the United States and Europe, putting the French nuclear forces under acute pressure, expanding possession of nuclear weapons and damaging international co-operation towards disarmament, all at great expense and without a solid basis of evidence. Weber, of course, is on manoeuvres, as the EPP is widely tipped to win this summer’s elecions for, and the European Parliament, and many were surprised that he did not become president of the European Commission in 2019. He must certainly have at least half an eye on a major position within the EU in the next few months.

We should applaud the Bavarian, at least, for identifying and facing up to a potential source of tension between the US and Europe if Donald Trump wins a second term. Having grasped the starting point, however, I think Weber has got every other part of his journey wrong.