NATO, the Washington Summit and Ukraine
Leaders of the alliance met in Washington to commemorate NATO's 75th birthday but also made important decisions on continuing assistance to Ukraine
This week’s NATO summit in Washington has not focused on the issues the alliance’s leaders might have wished. Most of the media have scrutinised President Joe Biden and his apparent mental acuity (or lack of it) after his disastrous and confused performance in last month’s presidential debate against Donald Trump. Biden did not help himself at the press conference last night when he accidentally introduced Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, as “President Putin”. The UK media have focused on the new prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and divided their attention between his assessment of President Biden’s cognitive condition and his general plans for British foreign and security policy.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. The agenda set out before the summit listed deterrence, collective defence, preparedness in the east of the alliance, nuclear policy and capability and, most critically, defence spending. I looked at how Starmer might approach the summit for The Spectator, and was sceptical of his ability to persuade fellow leaders to increase their financial commitment. Looking beyond the media circus, however, there were some important developments in relation to Ukraine set out in the official summit declaration published on Wednesday.
The broad message was supportive but lacked precision. NATO heads of state and government confirmed:
We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. A strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine is vital for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Ukraine’s fight for its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders directly contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.
The declaration also repeated the message from previous summits: “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”. Crucially, the document spoke of Ukraine’s “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership”. These are all very welcome for those who support ongoing assistance to the government in Kyiv. However, there were more specific provisions.
The alliance has issued a pledge of long-term security assistance which sets out a baseline of $40 billion in support for the next year. This will include the purchase of military equipment, in-kind support, maintenance, logistics and transportation costs, training and investments in and support for Ukraine’s defence infrastructure and defence industry. This commitment will be funded by NATO member states proportionately according to their share of the alliance’s gross domestic product.
There are two more important announcements. The first is the creation of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), a military command with its headquarters at US Army Garrison Wiesbaden under an American three-star commanding officer, to co-ordinate the provision of military equipment and training. It will comprise around 700 personnel from NATO member states “and select partners”. The declaration is explicit on one legal issue:
[It] will support Ukraine’s self-defence in line with the UN Charter. NSATU will not, under international law, make NATO a party to the conflict. It will support the transformation of Ukraine’s defence and security forces, enabling its further integration with NATO.
One key task of NSATU will be to help Ukraine make the reforms necessary for its eventual membership of NATO, including standards of conduct and training as well as interoperability of equipment and doctrine.
Secondly, the secretary general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, has agreed to appoint a senior representative in Ukraine to “act as a focal point for NATO’s engagement with Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv”. I looked at this proposal last month, and suggested it was a broadly positive idea which could bring benefits, though it should not be allowed to distract from the overriding priority which is getting equipment and ammunition to the Ukrainian armed forces as quickly as possible. Importantly, this figure will also play a key part in managing Ukraine’s accession process and assist in the reform of Ukraine’s defence institutions.
The identity of the senior representative will be vital to the success of this post. A respected, able, heavyweight figure could be a genuine force multiplier in the NATO-Ukraine relationship, speeding up the supply chain for equipment and bringing about rapid and effective institutional reforms. But this will only make a significant difference if the senior representative is both able and given a great deal of autonomy and flexibility. We should look at the protocol of British and other ambassadors and make the formality real: our envoys are technically styled “ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary”, and it is that last word, plenipotentiary, which has to come into play for the NATO senior representative. A plenipotentiary has the full authority to take independent action, and while modern communications can tempt governments to intervene frequently and lean towards micromanagement, that would be a severe disadvantage for a 32-member alliance like NATO. The senior representative should be issued with a clear mandate and guidelines, but given as much leeway as possible to achieve those objectives.
This week’s summit has not been the joyful 75th birthday celebration for which one might have hoped. A shaky US president, a potential successor who is deeply sceptical of the alliance as a whole, a destabilised French president after snap elections for the National Assembly last weekend, a British prime minister in office only for a few days, a chancellor of Germany whose personality popularity has collapsed, a prime minister of the Netherlands in office for barely a week, the conflict in Ukraine at a dangerously bloody standstill and ongoing division over Israel’s military operations in Gaza: if this is not a perfect storm, it is certainly a greater agglomeration of challenges than many foresaw.
NATO has a lot to do to start shifting the balance decisively against Russia in military terms, and institutional innovations do not capture headlines in the way that human drama does. Nevertheless, the detailed provisions contained in the Washington declaration should be modestly welcomed. The creation of the NSATU at Wiesbaden and the appointment of a civilian senior representative of the alliance in Kyiv should both make NATO’s support for Ukraine more efficient and more effective. As some of history’s less flashy generals—George Marshall, Alan Brooke, Max Hoffmann—would attest, there are times when success is achieved by the accumulation of modest administrative refinements and painstaking attention to detail. Let us hope that NATO has that lesson in mind as the new institutions are fully established over the coming weeks and months.